Abstract-Provisioning is the starting point of the whole life-cycle of IoT devices. The traditional provisioning methods of IoT devices are facing several issues, either about user experience or privacy harvesting. Moreover, IoT devices are vulnerable to different levels of attacks due to limited resources and long online duration.
I. Introduction
New IoT application scenarios including smart hotels, smart home, intelligent manufacturing, brilliant factory, etc., are being developed in the commercial market with the help of mass sales of smart speakers, smart bulbs, smart routers, and smart sensors. However, IoT devices are vulnerable to different levels of attacks due to limited resources and long online duration. Moreover, the existing authentication technology is relatively difficult to transplant to the home and office LAN environment with a certain scale of IoT equipment due to its relatively complicated design.
Provisioning is the first procedure in the whole life-cycle and trust chain of IoT device, involving the exchange of sensitive credential and plain-text passphrase of smart home infrastructure. It builds up the cornerstone of trust in identity authentication and secure transmission in the entire life cycle of IoT.
The traditional provisioning methods of IoT device are usually based on temporary WiFi hotspot or WiFi side channels. Specifically, the IoT device establishes a temporary WiFi hotspot before the smartphone connects into this temporary network, performing related configuration. The disadvantage is that the operation is complicated and not user-friendly. Another commonly utilized technology that provides a better user experience is often referred to as SmartCfg. Basically, the underlying principle of SmartCfg is "packet length modulation". The IoT device can listen to the packet length of the encrypted WiFi packet, obtain the initial password information, and complete the access networking. Besides, mac addresses of WiFi broadcasting packets are being utilized as a side channel as well. Unfortunately, the credentials of this kind of provisioning technology can be harvested by adversaries, since the sensitive information is being transmitted over the air without any cryptographic protection [1] . Other methods of provisioning utilizing visual light communication between the screen and photodiode in IoT devices are in use as well, however, this could potentially increase the manufacturing cost.
Fortunately, there are some efforts from the market which could take away the barrier between the cryptographic level of trust and consumer application, such as Universal 2nd Factor token. Two-factor Authentication (2FA) is publicly adopted as the most effective way to reduce the incidence of online identity theft and other online fraud. FIDO Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) [2] [3] is an open standard that strengthens and simplifies 2FA, with native support in platforms and browsers and has been used by Facebook [4] , Google [5] , Github [6] , Dropbox [7] , etc. A secure element which performs cryptographic functions and stores key pairs are embedded in each FIDO U2F key, establishing the root of trust cryptographically. It has several advantages over traditional password model, by introducing challenge-response approaches to complete the verification. Furthermore, it is USB driver-free as well as supported by multi most commonly used browsers such as Chrome, Firefox.
In this paper, we proposed U2Fi, a novel provisioning scheme for IoT devices. We provide a solution to make the U2F device that has been trusted by the cloud in the distribution process, via WiFi (with IP connection) or WiFi side channel (no IP connection). , to provision arXiv:1906.06009v1 [cs.CR] 14 Jun 2019 the new IoT device. Further, subsequent device settings modification, setting update, and owner change can also be performed by using a U2F device that has been trusted to improve security and provide a better user experience. This could provide helpful user friendliness to some valuable application scenarios in IoT, such as the smart hotel. Users could migrate the whole authentication of smart devices into a new site by simply inserting the universal cryptographic token into the secure gateway and authorizing by pressing the user-presence button on the token. Besides, the relevant unbinding process could also be done with a single cryptographic operation signed by the cryptographic token.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related background technologies are introduced, limitations of which are discussed as well. In Section III, we introduce the design goal as well as the architecture of U2Fi. Evaluations of a scenario in the world of IoT are provided and discussed in Section IV.
II. Backgrounds
In this section, we will discuss several provisioning schemes that are commonly used in the IoT world, advantages and disadvantages of which will also be discussed. Next, we will introduce the principle and advantages of the universal cryptographic token, and some security events will be briefly introduced.
A. Provisioning Methods of IoT Devices
Provisioning is the starting point of the whole life-cycle of IoT Devices. It involves the exchange of sensitive credential and plain-text passphrase of smart home infrastructure and builds up the cornerstone of trust in identity authentication and secure transmission in the entire life cycle of IoT.
1) Temporary WiFi Hot Spot:
Most IoT devices, limited by cost and computing power, are usually designed to be headless and lack user interaction. One of the most common methods of provisioning is to press and hold the configuration button on the IoT device to bring it into configuration mode. Subsequently, the IoT device itself became a temporary WiFi hotspot. Users use their own smartphones to access this temporary hotspot and perform related configuration operations. This approach does not require additional hardware and development work for IoT devices, as most IoT devices have built-in WiFi support. For example, Google Home, Google Chromecast, Amazon Echo, etc. all use this provisioning scheme.
However, this program has significant deficiencies. First, setting up a temporary hotspot and switching the phone to that hotspot configuration, and then switching back to the wireless network infrastructure used daily, takes a long time and often leads to failure. Second, this solution is even more powerless for the initial access scenario of large-scale IoT devices, because its trouble is further increased.
2) WiFi Side Channel: SmartCfg: Another way to provide a slightly better user experience is called SmartCfg. SmartCfg is a provisioning scheme proposed by Texas Instrument [8] . Its basic principle is to use some side channel features of WiFi, such as the broadcast packet length, or the MAC address of the broadcast packet, as the distribution method of provisioning credentials. The advantage of this solution is that the user only needs to press the configuration button on the IoT device to put it into configuration mode. The mobile phone no longer needs to wait for the IoT device to establish a temporary WiFi hotspot and then connect. However, the user must enter the name and password of the accessed WiFi infrastructure on the smartphone, which will then be transmitted on the WiFi side channel in plain text or with limited encryption strength. In recent years, some researchers have given the possibility that SmartCfg is heavily collected in clear text transmitted during the provisioning process [1] .
In addition, there are some restrictions in this way. For example, the IoT device must have its WiFi network card enter a special promiscuous mode to monitor the WiFi packets in the air. This can lead to some compatibility issues.
3) Visible Light Communication:
There are other provisioning methods that simply introduce an additional photodiode on the IoT device to sense the flashing intensity of the flash on the smartphone screen, which modulates the plaintext password required to access the WiFi. The shortcomings of this scheme are also obvious. Due to the instability of this communication method, the configuration fails every now and then. Furthermore, additional photodiodes also require the introduction of new materials and manufacturing costs, which is vital in the production process of a very large number of IoT equipment.
B. Universal Cryptographic Tokens 1) FIDO Universal 2nd
Factor: FIDO is short for Fast IDentity Online, which is an industry consortium launched in February 2013. U2F is short for Universal 2nd Factor, which is an open authentication standard that strengthens and simplifies two-factor authentication using a specialized USB or NFC device. It is initially developed by Google and Yubico.
It's now supported by Google, Facebook, Github, Dropbox, Gitlab, Wordpress, Fastmail, Salesforce, Micro Focus, Bitbucket, dashlane, Centrify, Duo, digidentity, RSA, PushCoin, IBM, Keeper, RCDevs, shibboleth, Sentry, privacyIDEA, StrongAuth, Compose, AuthStack, WSO2, gandi.net, SAASPASS and so on.
Native browser supported of Chrome was introduced in 2014 by Google. Support for Firefox Quantum was added in November 2017. As for Safari, there are some 3rd-party plugins.
2) Benefits of Utilizing U2F: There several advantages of utilizing U2F technology, such as:
• Driverless: With USB-HID utilized, there's no need for an extra driver in the operating system. It works out of the box in most commonly used operating systems such as Windows, macOS, Linux, and ChromeOS.
• Plugin-less: There's no extra plugin to be installed in web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox Quantum, Opera(based on Chromium). They are now providing native U2F support. Other browsers on the way.
• Expandable: The underlying raw message layer can be run over Bluetooth Low Energy and NFC.
• Privacy: It will not leak the user's identification since no biometric information or phone number is needed.
3) Test of User Presence: The Test of User Presence (TUP)
is an optional function in FIDO U2F standard to prevent inadvertent authentication when a USB U2F device is still plugged in. Basically, it's a boolean parameter, which is signed as well as other response data by the private key inside the USB device.
4) Secure Element:
Typically, a well-designed U2F device should be built with a cryptographic chip which is called 'Secure Element'. A Secure Element generally has one or more of the following abilities: a) On-chip public and private key pair generation, and the corresponding public key can be exported later. b) The public and private key pair are generated outside the SE, and then the private key can be imported to the secure element. c) Non-cryptographic storage: write-only data (One Time Programming Zone) d) Monotonic counters. If the secure element is used as a scenario a), the whole process can be considered as 'secureelement-level' safe. On the other hand, if scenario b) is used, during the manufacturing process the private key could possibly be recorded.
5) Key Wrapping Mechanism:
According to the FIDO U2F standard document [9] , key-wrapping mechanism makes it possible to authenticate with unlimited numbers of devices, allowing for inexpensive U2F devices. The Key Handle issued by the U2F device does not have to be an index to the private key stored on board the U2F device secure element chip. Instead, the Key Handle can 'store' (i.e., contain) the private key for the origin and the hash of the origin encrypted with a 'wrapping' key known only to the U2F device secure element.
6) Security Evalutations on U2F:
Security evaluations on U2F key-wrapping [10] indicate that it could introduce a supply-chain risk if the anti-clone counter is not well implemented and checked. A security bulletin has been published by FIDO alliance, and related vendors have been informed.
Another group of researchers demonstrated how to circumvent the FIDO U2F origin check using WebUSB [11] . This kind of attack bypassed the origin check of the web browser by setting up a phishing website utilizing W3C WebUSB [12] to intercept U2F raw messages. It has been fixed by the web browser vendor by blacklisting access types of WebUSB feature.
Those attacks, as far as we know, are not related to U2F authenticators. Thus, we should still be able to utilize the well-designed universal authenticators as the cryptographic signature generator in IoT scenarios. 
III. Proposed Design

A. Design Goals
Our design goal is to apply a two-factor authentication technique based on cryptographic public key systems in a resource-constrained IoT environment. Based on the challenge-response authentication method, the technology provides an easy-to-develop, use, and maintain identity authentication technology. It has the advantages of USB driver-free support and native browser native support, which can dynamically generate a large number of temporary keys simultaneously and meet the multi-semantic authentication requirements.
In order to achieve this design goal, we use WiFi-based packet length modulation technology in the U2F token access process. At present, U2F technology only supports BTLE/NFC/USB (HID) in the physical layer, and WiFi is not supported in the standard. The WiFi-based packet length modulation technology enables the IoT device to obtain the initial password information and complete the access networking by monitoring the packet length of the encrypted WiFi packet without completing the WiFi access.
Our design is based on U2F's IoT key nodes and authentication protocols. IoT nodes increase the risk of being compromised and controlled by features such as wide distribution, difficulty in operation, numerous permissions, and long-term online. Therefore, it is necessary to further introduce enhanced security mechanisms to improve its security protection level. Design techniques for critical nodes and authentication protocols rely on what users know about secrets to ensure security, and on the other hand, use userowned (what you have) secrets to further enhance security.
In the IoT access networking and management, this key technology can provide an authentication mechanism that enhances security. However, the details of its certification agreement still need to be designed, and its security model needs to be strictly demonstrated. Typically, there are different 7 roles in our model. The IoT device, which is a blank device without any user information. A COTS U2F key, in possession of the user, is offline in most of the time. A mobile phone, which is also in possession of the user, however, is online most of the time. In our system, we will avoid any possible use of the online mobile phone as the attestation provider. As for the cloud side, a new authentication server providing U2F validation functionality is introduced alongside the regular IoT service providing server.
B. Architecture
As for the U2F key enrolling phrase, the user will initiate a normal U2F binding process within the U2F portal website provided by the IoT service provider. After necessary security information such as account name, passphrase, IP address, or even biometric characteristics are validated, the public key and key handle of the U2F token is bound to the user's account.
As for the provisioning phrase for new registered IoT device, the user should initiate a user identity binding request with the help of a secure gateway. Regularly, the design could use the help of existing user interaction method in a COTS wireless router, such as multiplexing the WPS button. After this phrase is initiated, the IoT cloud will contact with U2F server to generate a U2F challenge and pass it on to the secure gateway. Then, the secure gateway will give a visual cue to the user indicating that the U2F token should be connected within a reasonable duration of time span. After the user has approved this provisioning action by pressing the user-presence button on the token, a cryptographic signature compatible with U2F response is generated and forwarded to the relying party, i.e. IoT cloud. Finally, the IoT cloud will generate an access token for the IoT device after validating the U2F response against U2F server. The entire provisioning phrase now has been successfully proceeded.
IV. Evaluations
In this section, we will evaluate the design of our proposed system by implementing a new IoT scenario. We will show the necessary implementation details. After that, some discussion of this implementation and achievement will also be provided.
A. Scenario Description
This new scenario focuses on solving the problem of users in a new environment who needs to commence the provisioning process of a bunch of temporary IoT devices, such as smart TV, smart speaker, smart bulb, smart power outlet, etc., and performing some high-privilege and sensitive behaviors, such as payment. Smart routers can be implemented as a secure gateway with reasonable small online upgrading. After connecting these smart devices to the infrastructure, users also need to complete the association of these devices with their own user identity. A typical example of this scenario would be a tenant in the smart hotel. In particular, the cryptographic token will be taken away when the user leaves the hotel. The secure gateway can be configured to cancel the temporary identity binding for all smart devices once the outgoing behavior is detected. 
B. Implementation of Secure Gateway
The security gateway integrates the U2Fhost forwarding module based on the basic functions of the network connection for each IoT device, adds U2F authentication, improves security, and implements management of multiple IoT devices with high management efficiency.
In this part, we use the Raspberry Pi as a security gateway. The reasons for selection are as follows: First, the Raspberry Pi supports USB access and can carry U2F tokens; second, the Raspberry Pi comes with a WiFi module to support various IoT devices; third, its Linux environment can The code of the U2F-host module is integrated, and various network protocols such as TCP/IP are supported, and the communication between the U2F token and the U2F Server and between the IoT device and the IoT Server can be well realized.
The U2F-host library is installed in the security gateway to exchange information such as challenge and response with the U2F token during the registration and authentication process. In addition, the paho-mqtt library is installed to communicate with the cloud service platform. By writing python code, you can exchange information between U2F tokens, security gateways, and U2F servers.
We provide a callback function based on paho-mqtt, invoking the U2F-host library. When the IoT Cloud needs to perform registration or authentication operations, it sends a message to the security gateway with the subject u2f_host, content 'register' or 'authenticate', and the security gateway discriminates the message content and calls the corresponding function. The function of the function is to simulate the user's registration or authentication operation.
C. Integration with Cloud Platform
The cloud service platform consists of two parts: U2F Server and IoT Cloud. It can be implemented on a PC by writing the corresponding python code. The U2F Server is a server that implements U2F registration and authentication. Support U2F registration/authentication operations. When a U2F Zero token is registered, the U2F Server will save the public key. When authentication is required, the U2F Server uses the public key to decrypt the encrypted data sent by the U2F host to complete the authentication. After registration/authentication, the U2F Server sends a message to the IoT Cloud indicating whether the registration/authentication was successful. After IoT Cloud receives this message, it can proceed. We provide a callback library for the U2F Server to serve those two functions.
The IoT Cloud is responsible for recording the registration information of the IoT device and allowing the user to remotely monitor the running status of the IoT device. User operations on the IoT Cloud can be divided into three categories: U2F registration operations, important operations (requires U2F authentication), and non-critical operations (no U2F authentication required).
• When the user initiates a U2F registration operation, the IoT Cloud will send an instruction to the security gateway to instruct it to start registration, and when the authentication is completed, ask the user which operations are set as important operations.
• When the user initiates an important operation, the IoT Cloud first sends an instruction to enable the U2F authentication to the security gateway. After the authentication is completed, the IoT Cloud sends the operation command to the IoT device.
• When the user initiates a non-critical operation, the IoT Cloud sends the operation command directly to the IoT device.
In the demonstration system, IoT Cloud can control the IoT device and realize the function of turning on the camera, which requires U2F authentication. The camera is initialized after register and open instruction input by the user.
D. Emulation of IoT Devices
In the demo system, the IoT device, emulated by a Raspberry Pi, will open the camera after receiving the command. The picamera library is utilized to control the onboard camera, and the paho-mqtt library is used to communicate with the IoT cloud. The core code is a callback function based on paho-mqtt, as shown in the following pseudocode. When the message U2F_AUTHENTICATED sent by the IoT cloud is received, the camera is turned on and the preview mode is entered. It can be seen from the above evaluations that the system can successfully add U2F authentication to the communication between the IoT device and the cloud server, and realize the verification of the physical authorization of the U2F token to the user entity.
E. Discussion
In the existing IoT system, the IoT Cloud does not need to be authenticated for the IoT device. If the attacker steals the user's ID and password, the IoT Cloud can be logged in to and send malicious instructions to the IoT device. In this system, before the cloud service sends important instructions to the device, it needs to wait for the user to perform U2F authentication operation (ie, press the button of the U2F token inserted on the security gateway). After the U2F authentication succeeds, the relevant commands can pass the security. The gateway sends the IoT device to ensure the security of communication between the IoT device and the cloud server.
Besides, we provide an improved SmartCfg distribution method. In the traditional distribution network solution and the mainstream SmartCfg distribution solution, the mobile device App and the IoT device need to be connected to each other, and then the SSID and password of the router are transmitted through the WiFi packet length modulation. In this work, the IoT device's network connection and U2F authentication are combined, and the U2F token on the security gateway can be operated securely, which greatly simplifies the distribution process.
At the same time, the combination of U2F standard and IoT security certification. U2F, as an emerging network security authentication method, has been widely used in many largescale services, but basically, it is aimed at network security. Combined with the current hot concept of IoT security authentication, we have successfully combined the two to achieve two-factor security authentication on the IoT platform, thereby using the security gateway (key node) to authenticate multiple IoT devices mounted. It achieves the purpose of secure communication and enhances the user's operating experience, which has great application prospects.
This could provide helpful user friendliness to some valuable new application scenarios in IoT, such as the smart hotel. Users could migrate the whole authentication of smart devices into a new site by simply inserting the universal cryptographic token into the secure gateway and authorizing by pressing the user-presence button on the token. Besides, the relevant unbinding process could also be done with a single cryptographic operation signed by the cryptographic token.
V. Conclusion
Our proposed solution includes a new SmartCfg encoding method to combine U2F with IoT security certification. Further, a feasible solution is proposed in the field of IoT security certification and a demonstration system is given.
Considering smart hotel, smart home and smart office scenarios, we can apply this solution to IoT devices and implemented the security management of batch devices, and improve the user's operating experience while ensuring security. The solution requires multi-party support for IoT terminals, security gateways (routers), U2F physical tokens, and commercial cloud services, which has great application prospects and a broad market.
